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RAMPART INDIVIDUALIST

A Journal of Free Market Scholarship

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The Three Enlightenments

by Kenneth R. Gregg, Jr.

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THE THREE ENLIGHTENMENTS¹

Kenneth R. Gregg, Jr.
Rampart Institute

*But my Brethren of the Sea-green Order, take a little wine with your water, and
Ile take a little water with my wine, and it will temper us to the best constitution...*
—Richard Overton, July 16, 1649.²

In order to simplify the subject of libertarianism, I'm going to break modern libertarian thought into three components. Using an analysis similar to that developed by Prof. Robert R. Palmer of Yale University in a recent essay, "The European Enlightenment in its American Setting,"³ I shall trace the major themes in libertarian thought: (1) the application of reason into the area of metaphysics and religion, Enlightenment I, or the Scientific Revolution; (2) The application of reason into the area of politics, Enlightenment II, sometimes referred to as the Republican Revolution; and (3) the application of reason into the area of economics, and into what was known in the early part of the nineteenth century as the social question, 'the right of the labourer to the whole produce of his labour,' the issue which provided the setting for the major debates in that century, which I shall refer to as the Third Enlightenment.

These are three closely interrelated traditions. However, some of the major figures involved in, for example, Enlightenment I are not necessarily involved in Enlightenment II or III, and vice-versa. There is a division of labor and specialization involved with any endeavor, and this applies just as readily to the advocacy of any position.

ENLIGHTENMENT I

Science

We are all children and beneficiaries of the free-thinkers of the Enlightenment. As Palmer says in his essay:

"It was the Enlightenment of science, both of actual science and of science in the more extended sense in which verifiable or organized knowledge was preferred to customary or authoritative ideas. In this Enlightenment, the former heavens had been replaced by Newtonian cosmology...Discovery, exploration and scientific expeditions pushed the boundaries of knowledge ever farther throughout the earth...The past no longer had any persuasive power in its own

right...The old belief in witches had faded, along with other superstitions. No enlightened person feared the devil. Miracles, oracles and lives of the saints were viewed with suspicion, and the Bible itself was not beyond doubt. There was a distaste for mystery, the very negation of knowledge. Revealed religion was a source of embarrassment, and natural religion was thought to be enough, a kind of placid deism in which belief in the Deity and in a future state for departed human beings was recommended."

"Real science knew no inherent regional or national limits, for anyone who could understand it, or who had the equipment, could participate. Franklin's experiment with his kite could be duplicated anywhere else. Observations of the transit of Venus in 1769 were made in Europe, Hudson Bay, and the Pacific ocean, and also at Philadelphia, and about twenty other places in the British American colonies. The best of these American observations were internationally reported. There was an international network of correspondence on scientific and related matters, carried on among academies and seats of learning. At a more popular level, which if not strictly scientific at least claimed to be rational, the American Enlightenment seems also to have resembled the European, or perhaps even exceeded it. A surprising percentage of Americans at the time of the Revolution were not members of any church. There seem to have been a great many popular free-thinkers. For example, on what was then the frontier, in Vermont before it even became a state, the celebrated Ethan Allen, in 1784, published a...deist...work, called *Reason, the Only Oracle of Man*."⁴

Indeed, many of the founding fathers, so-called, were deists, and not Christians, as commonly believed. Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Thomas Paine and many of the other prominent individuals involved in the American Revolution were deists and free-thinkers.⁵

It isn't my purpose to delve into the relationship between the different Enlightenments.⁶ However, I do want to mention in brief two of the major strands of modern free-thought⁷ important to nineteenth century libertarians, deism and atheism. Most of the American radical libertarians were either deists or atheists; deism being common in the first half of the nineteenth century, and atheism becoming important in the second half.

Deism

Deism, or the religion of nature, generally regards god as the "watch-maker," or "absentee landlord." That is to say, after god builds and winds up the universe (the watch), it is left alone to operate on its own. God is understood only by understanding "his works," the laws of nature and the results thereof. The deists' god is nature's god. The most important feature of deism for our purpose is the advocates' reliance on relatively rigorous epistemological standards and the application of scientific methodology for understanding the universe (god and god's works).

While there are numerous precursors to deism, notably in the early Greek philosophers, in the Renaissance with the Socinians, Servetus and the rise of Unitarianism, the "father of Deism" is regarded to be Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) with the publication of *De Veritate* in 1624. Herbert sought

to develop a religious philosophy that needs no special revelation. The only road to reliable religious conviction was through the study of the conditions and possibilities of knowledge. He opened *De Veritate* with chapters on, for example, "the general conditions and definitions of truth," "the conditions of perception" before he discussed religion. As Peter Gay points out in his anthology on deism, "from Herbert on, deism sought to rest its case, explicitly or implicitly, on epistemological foundations."⁸

For the next century and a half, deism had an unprecedented rise, both in England and continental Europe. The most important works include Charles Blount's *Anima Mundi* (1679), *Great is Diana of the Ephesians* (1680), *Oracles of Reason* (1693); the Lockean John Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious* (1696); Anthony Collins' (another Lockean) *Discourse of Freethinking* (1713) and *Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* (1724); Thomas Woolston's six *Discourses on the Miracles of Our Savior* (1727-1729); Matthew Tindal's *Christianity as Old as Creation* (1730); Peter Annet's *The Resurrection of Jesus Considered* (1744), *History and Character of Saint Paul* (1750); and, of course, Voltaire's numerous writings on the subject beginning probably with his *Sermon of the Fifty* in 1760.

The deist literature from this period is quite extensive and the anti-deist responses even more so. Matthew Tindal's work alone elicited over one hundred and fifty replies.⁹ Perhaps the most important anti-deist essay was Bishop Joseph Butler's *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution of Nature* (1736). He argued that god has revealed himself in the course of events, and that the God of the deists (who speaks through his natural works), and the God of the Christians (who speaks through special providences and particular miracles) are open to the same objections. If one must be rejected, the other must be rejected. Man's moral nature, from which he reasoned to the moral constitution of the universe, was a constitution that could only have been granted by the very God Who is Revealed in Scriptures.¹⁰

The deist literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a literature predominantly of the upper and middle classes. It filtered down to the citizenry only in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At this time, the circulation of Bishop Butler's *Analogy*... only served to spread deism by bringing the issues before multitudes who would not otherwise have heard of them.¹¹ This became a popular book, though not for reasons that the Christians would particularly approve of.

The most important proponent of deism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was Thomas Paine. His *Age of Reason Part I* in 1793 and *Part II* in 1795 brought the idea of deism to the people in continental Europe, England and America with the efforts of Paine's many disciples, including Elihu Palmer and George Henry Evans in America, and Richard Carlile and William Cobbett in England.

Atheism

Atheism is primarily a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first explicit atheist to have survived without either being burned at the stake or having his works burned in his stead, was Baron d'Holbach, the wealthy German patron of the philosophes. While he wrote a series of anti-Christian treatises under a variety of pseudonyms, he is justly known for his principal work, *System of Nature* (1770).¹² He states:

“Let us then conclude that the word *God*..., not presenting to the mind any true idea, ought to be banished (from) the language of all those who are desirous to speak so as to be understood.”¹³

This is a theme which, beginning with d’Holbach, we can see in atheist literature up to the present day. Charles Bradlaugh, one of the most prominent and outspoken atheists of the nineteenth century, argues in his *A Plea for Atheism* (1864), that:

The Atheist does not say ‘there is no God,’ but he says: ‘I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea of God; the word ‘God’ is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation, and the conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me. If, however, ‘God’ is defined to mean an existence other than the existence of which I am a mode, then I deny ‘God,’ and affirm that it is impossible such ‘God’ can be. That is, I affirm one existence, and deny that there can be more than one.”¹⁴

Similarly, in a recent book by George H. Smith, he succinctly states that:

“Atheism, in its basic form, is not a belief; it is the absence of belief. An atheist is not primarily a person who believes that a god does not exist; rather, he does not believe in the existence of a god...The atheist *qua* atheist does not believe anything requiring demonstration; the designation of ‘atheist’ tells us, not what he believes to be true, but what he does not believe to be true. If others wish for him to accept the existence of a god, it is their responsibility to argue for the truth of theism—but the atheist is not similarly required to argue for the truth of atheism.”¹⁵

Fundamentally, the primary distinction between deism and atheism is that, in addition to the epistemological and methodological rigors of deism, atheism stresses another point of reason and logic to Enlightenment I thought: the *onus probandum* of the Thomist philosophers (the burden of proof is with he who asserts the proposition), and the principle of Occam’s Razor (one should never multiply explanations or increase their complexity beyond necessity). However, in either case, the fundamental idea behind both schools of thought is the use of the principles of reason into the area of religion.

Does this mean that all libertarians are deists or atheists? No. It does indicate an important aspect of libertarianism, however. That is, that the principles of ethics and of the social realm are subject to rational analysis. In this point, deists and atheists concur with many other schools of thought, perhaps the most notable is the Thomist tradition within the Catholic church. “For Aquinas...the human being does not receive the moral law simply as an imposition from above: he recognizes or can recognize its inherent rationality and binding force, and he promulgates it to himself.”¹⁶

For Herbert Spencer as for Thomas Aquinas, the “business of moral science (is) to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct;

and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.”¹⁷ This “rational utilitarianism,”¹⁸ as Spencer termed it, views “justice (as)...the reception by each individual of the benefits and evils of his own conduct...Justice...requires that the connection between conduct and consequence...shall not be traversed.”¹⁹

ENLIGHTENMENT II

The Levellers

While there were libertarian sentiments in the sixteenth century, particularly *A Discourse of Voluntary Servitude* (1577) by Etienne de la Boetie,²⁰ *Francogallia* (1573) by Francois Hotman, *Right of Magistrates* (1574) by Theodore Beza, and *The Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants* (1579) probably by Phillippe du Plessis-Mornay,²¹ recent historians regard the rebels of the Puritan Revolution in the seventeenth century as the progenitors of modern libertarian thought.²² It is interesting to note that both Enlightenment I and II originate during this same time, and, I might add, for the same reasons; the growing recognition of the importance of scientific methodology.

The radicals of the Puritan Revolution were generally known by what was at first a term of opprobrium, the Levellers, because it was claimed that they wished to “level” society. They did advocate this position in a sense, because, among other things, they were strong advocates of the idea of equality before the law. They wanted equal treatment for all people from the government, regardless whether the person is a commoner, lord or even the king.

In the words of the Levellers, “our aime (is) that the Common-wealth be reduced to such a passe that every man may with as much security as may be, enjoy his propriety...(and) the proper right and Title that every man has to what is his own.”²³ In order to guarantee this, they created, for the first time in England, a written constitution called “An Agreement of the People,” on October 15, 1647.²⁴ In it, they argued that the law must be subject to equity, and the rulers must be subject to law. The fundamental laws of the state, moreover, must be written down so that men might know their rights.²⁵ For the protection of the individual and the restraint of privilege in all its forms, the Levellers pressed in the name of natural right for the adoption of popular representative government.²⁶ The Agreement sought to provide biennial Parliaments with a redistribution of seats in proportion to population. The authority of all future Parliaments was to be inferior only to that of those who chose them, and was to extend to whatever is not reserved by the Agreement. Such matters as freedom of religion, freedom from impressment, the equality of all before the law were guaranteed. State-enforced monopolies were to be abolished and all trade was to become free; no man would be forced to testify against himself in court; all cases and facts of the cases were to be determined by a jury of twelve men selected at large from the community.²⁷

As Richard Overton wrote in his pamphlet, “An Arrow Against All Tyrants and Tyranny, shot from the Prison of New-gate into the Prerogative Bowels of the Arbitrary House of Lords,” on October 10, 1646:

“...By naturall birth, all men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedom, and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature into this world, everyone with a naturall, innate

freedome and propriety (as it were writ in the table of every mans heart, never to be obliterated) even so are we to live, every one equally and alike to enjoy his Birthright and privilege;...whereof God by nature hath made him free...Every man by nature being a King, Priest and Prophet in his owne naturall circuite and compass, whereof no second may partake, but by deputation, commission, and free consent from him, whose right and freedome it is. To every individual in nature is given an individual property by nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any, for every one as he is himself, so he hath a self propriety, else could he not be himself...No man hath power over my rights and liberties and I over no man's."²⁸

As John Lilburne, the man generally recognized as the leader of the Levellers, argued in "The Free Man's Freedom Vindicated," on June 16, 1646:

"God...gave man...a rational soul or understanding and thereby created him after His own image...Every particular and individual man and woman that ever breathed in the world since (Adam and Eve) are and were by nature all equall and alike in power, dignity, authority and majesty, none of them having (by nature) any authority dominion or magisterial power, one over...another. Neither have they or can they exercise any, but merely by institution or donation, that is to say...by mutual consent and agreement for the good...and comfort each of other and not for the...hurt or damage of any; it being unnatural, irrational,...sinful, wicked and unjust, for any man or men whatsoever, to part with so much of their power as shall enable any of their Parliament men, commissioners, trustees, deputies, viceroys, ministers, officers and servants to destroy and undo them therewith. And unnatural, irrational,...devilish and tyrannical it is, for any man whatsoever, spiritual or temporal, clergyman or layman to...assume unto himself a power...to rule, govern or reign over any sort of men in the world without their free consent."²⁹

The chief of the natural rights a man may not surrender is his liberty of conscience, his freedom to think and to utter his thoughts. Richard Overton argued that what one man may not surrender to another is his "self propriety," his property in himself, his individuality. The originality of the Levellers lay in their discovery that all magistrates, even Parliament itself, must be 'bounded' lest they invade the inner shrine of individuality.³⁰

The Levellers were advocates of the rights of *both* men and women, certainly a novel idea in the seventeenth century. They rejected not only distinctions of class, but the patriarchal domination so characteristic of that age, let alone this millenia.

Indeed, John Lilburne was not the only member of that family in a position of importance within the Levellers. Elizabeth Lilburne, his wife, was recognized as one of the active leaders of the movement. But the most important woman leader was Katherine Chidley, who wrote in one of her pamphlets to the Parliament, signed by over 10,000 women, that:

"Since we are assured of our creation in the image of God, of an interest in Christ equal unto men, as also of a proportionate share in the freedoms of the commonwealth, we cannot but wonder and grieve that we should appear so despicable in your eyes as to be thought unworthy to petition or represent our grievances to this honourable House. Have we not an equal interest with the men of this nation in those liberties and securities contained in the Petition of Right, and other good laws of the land? Are any of our lives, limbs, liberties or goods to be taken from us, no more than from men, but by due process of law and conviction of twelve sworn men of the neighborhood? And can you imagine us to be so sottish or stupid as not to perceive or not to be sensible when daily those strong defences of our peace and welfare are broken down and trod underfoot by force and arbitrary power?"³¹

Before we leave the Levellers, please note that they were proponents not only of civil liberties like the right to refuse to self-incriminate oneself (which is directly attributable to John Lilburne), but of what Blackstone later called the "Palladium of Liberty," trial by jury. The Levellers believed that the jury are judges of law as well as of fact. Law must conform to certain general principles which constitute "common right, common equity and common reason." If it violates these principles it cannot claim the obedience of the people. The mere fact that a Parliament had passed an iniquitous act did not suffice to make it good law. "Where reason ceaseth, the law ceaseth," and "all customs and prescriptions (Acts of Paliament, laws and judgments) that be against reason are void and null in themselves." A jury was capable of deciding by the light of nature when an act of Parliament violated the dictates of reason. Parliament in their view was, after all, only the servant of the sovereign people, entrusted for a limited time with limited powers.³²

The jury, as the arbiter of guilt and innocence, is the personification in twelve members of the society of the beliefs of that society. To make certain of this, each litigant is allowed to exclude from jury service those who, in his opinion, possess a bias or prejudice against himself or his opponent. The judgment of a jury, then, represents the judgment of every member of society who has no particular interest in either party of the case, but in the general interest of "common rights, common equity and common reason."

They also have the honour of being among the first to protest against an aggressive colonial war. William Walwyn said that:

"The sending over Forces to Ireland is nothing else but to make war by the blood of the Army to enlarge their (England's) territories of power and Tyranny, that it is an unlawful war, a cruel and bloody work to go to destroy the Irish Natives for their Consciences, and to drive them from their proper natural and native Rights."³³

To recap, the Levellers believed that men and women possessed "natural rights," and to insure these rights within the common-wealth, the people are to be sovereign. The form of government within the republic (*res publica*) is to be a representative democracy provided by the consent of the governed, and the law of

the land is to be protected against iniquitous encroachment by trial by the people (trial by jury), rather than trial by the government.

Nineteenth Century Revolution in Politics

The ideas that changed the face of the nineteenth century originated primarily with the Levellers in the seventeenth and transmitted through the eighteenth in the traditions developed here in America and in Britain by the commonwealthmen, the radical whigs who were, according to Robert L'Estrange:

“A Certain *Bold* kind of a Boysterous *Animal*, that will not *Brook* so much as the *Breath* of a *King*, or a *Bishop*; And where he cannot *Undermine* them by fair *Means*, he makes it his business to *Destroy* them by *Foul*.”³⁴

“Rebellion to Tyrants is Obedience to God,” as Jefferson, Adams and Franklin once suggested for the seal of the newly formed United States.

During each period of change, there is (at least) one person that is pivotal to that period. That is to say, one cannot fully understand that period without reference to a given individual. For example, one cannot fully understand the Scientific Revolution without reference to the work of Isaac Newton. Likewise, one cannot understand the demise of the Old Order (*Ancien Regime*, monarchy) and the concomitant rise of Republican forms of government without reference to Thomas Paine, who effectively changed the thinking of the American and French revolutionaries from that of mere rebellion to rejection of the principle of monarchy.

Just as important, “Paine not only composed the most telling attack upon monarchy to be published in America (with *Common Sense*), but he was also the first pamphleteer in America to reach a mass audience. Political writings, heretofore, were addressed to society’s elite who, it was believed, were uniquely capable of understanding such matters. Paine’s primary audience was not the elite, but the rising laboring and artisan class of which he himself was a representative. Paine’s genius lies in his...style. In its content and as a new genre of political literature, *Common Sense* is a revolutionary work.”³⁵

In just three month’s time, *Common Sense* had sold over 120,000 copies,³⁶ within the first year, at least twenty-five separate editions were published in the United States alone.³⁷ It was said by an American in France that it “has a greater run, if possible, here than in America.”³⁸ “According to contemporary newspapers, *Common Sense* turned thousands to independence who before could not endure the thought. It worked nothing short of miracles and turned Tories into Whigs.”³⁹

Common Sense, and the *Crisis Papers* by Thomas Paine were only the beginning statements of the new propaganda war of the republican radicals against monarchy. While the battle between the British Empire and the American Independents was being fought an ocean away from the Monarch, the war, both intellectual and political, had begun in new territory, France.

In 1789, Abbe Sieyes published his famous work, *What is the Third Estate?* Sieyes’ work ran through four editions in the first year and, like *Common Sense*, defended the ideas of republicanism (representative democracy based on the rights of the “commoners,” the “third estate”) and attacked the idea of a caste

within society which maintains special rights over and above the citizenry. “A privileged class is a plague for the Nation which suffers it,” as Sieyes said.⁴⁰

In 1791 and 1792, Paine’s *Rights of Man Part I* and *Part II* were published in defense of the French Revolution and the ideas of Republicanism. Shortly after the publication of *Part I*, thousands of copies appeared in a variety of editions,⁴¹ touching off the revolutionary movement in England⁴² and strengthening the ardor of those in France. *Part II* had an even greater impact as there were (in England) organizations prepared to distribute it. By 1793, sales reached 200,000,⁴³ and may have reached a million copies thereafter.⁴⁴

Catherine Koumarianou said that:

In the last decade of the eighteenth century the French Revolution not only acted as an inspiration to the peoples of Europe, and in particular to the subject peoples, but it also provided the political and ideological content for movements which, until then, had been unable to express in concrete terms even their immediate aims, or to organize their activities coherently. For the Greeks, the presence of French republican forces in the Ionian Islands in the years 1797-1798, quite apart from the moral force it exercised, constituted a very real stimulus to concrete political activity aimed at national liberation. And so toward the end of the century, partly as a result of the activities of the intellectuals, a section of Greek society was ideologically prepared (and)...led by these intellectuals to take up the struggle to overthrow national oppression...Many of the vague aspirations and spontaneous movements...were given concrete form by the French Revolution.”⁴⁵

The French Revolution inspired a new integration of German politics based upon a liberal basis.⁴⁶ In Russia, Alexander Radishchev, the man that Catherine the Great regarded as the French Revolution’s “first champion in Russia,”⁴⁷ sought to abolish the system of serf-ownership and arbitrary, absolutist rule. In Spain, the French Revolution provided the irritants that transformed the monarchical reaction into a liberal constitution with popular control of the king through representation.⁴⁸

At the same time, the Spanish colonies were finding in the American and French Revolutions, philosophic justifications for long-standing resentments against rule by men born across the ocean.⁴⁹ In Mexico, many of the intellectuals were admirers of the French Revolution.⁵⁰ In northern South America, Francisco de Miranda, Pedro Fermin de Vargas, Antonio Narino, and Simon Bolivar, the precursors to the independence movements in South America, were all disciples of the new ideas of human liberty.

The very example of the United States excited the imagination of Spanish Americans, and its embodiment of liberty and republicanism placed a powerful example before their eyes. The works of Tom Paine, the speeches of John Quincy Adams, Jefferson and Washington all circulated in Spanish America. Many of the precursors and leaders of independence visited the United States and saw free institutions at first hand; Bolivar was a life-long admirer of Washington and an envious partisan of the United States, “land of freedom and home of civic virtue,” as he described it. The constitutions of many of the South American countries

were modeled on the Constitution of the United States, including those of Venezuela and Mexico.³¹

Anarchism

During the 1830's and '40's, radical republicans were criticizing many of the basic political assumptions of republicanism, in part, due to the failure of the republican regimes to accomplish their liberal goals. While many of the best statements were provided by the American radicals, one of the finest statements penned on the subject of representative democracy was written by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon a few weeks after the February (1848) Revolution in Paris had replaced the constitutional monarchy of King Louis-Phillipe with a nominally democratic republic:

"The illusion of democracy springs from that of consitutional Monarchy's example—claiming to organize Government by representative means. Neither the Revolution of July (1830), nor that of February (1848) has sufficed to illuminate this. What they always want is inequality of fortunes, delegation of sovereignty, and government by influential people. Instead of saying, as did M. Thiers, the King reigns and does not govern, democracy says, the People reigns and does not govern, which is to deny the Revolution..."

"Since, according to the ideology of the democrats, the People cannot govern itself and is forced to give itself to representatives who govern by delegation, while it retains the right of review, it is supposed that the People is quite capable of at least of having itself represented, that it can be represented faithfully...This hypothesis is utterly false; there is not and never can be legitimate representation of the People. All electoral systems are mechanisms for deceit: to know one is sufficient to pronounce the condemnation of all."

"In order that the deputy represent his constituents, it is necessary that he represent all the ideas which have united to elect him...But, with the electoral system, the deputy, the would-be legislator sent by the citizens to reconcile all ideas and all interests in the name of the People, always represents just one idea, one interest. The rest is excluded without pity. For who makes law in the elections? Who decides the choice of deputies? The majority, half plus one of the votes. From this it follows that half less one of the electors is not represented or is so in spite of itself, that of all the opinions that divide the citizens, one only, insofar as the deputy has an opinion, arrives at the legislature, and finally that the law, which should be the expression of the will of the People, is only the expression of half of the People."

"The result is that in the theory of the democrats the problem consists of eliminating, by the mechanism of sham universal suffrage, all ideas save one which stir opinion, and to declare sovereign that which has the majority."

"...In every kind of government the deputy belongs to the powerful, not to the country...(It is required) that he be master of his vote, that is, to traffic in its sale, that the mandate have a specified term, of at least a year, during which the Government, in agreement with

the deputies, does what it pleases and gives strength to the law through action by its own arbitrary will..."

"If monarchy is the hammer which crushes the People, democracy is the axe which divides it; the one and the other equally conclude in the death of liberty..."

"By virtue of democratic principle, all citizens must participate in the formation of the law...(and) all must pay their debt to their native land, as taxpayers, jurors, judges and soldiers."

"If things could happen in this way, the ideal of democracy would be attained. It would have a normal existence, developing directly in the sense of its principle, as do all things which have life and grow."

"It is completely otherwise in democracy, which according to the authors exists fully only at the moment of elections and for the formation of legislative power. This moment once past, democracy retreats; it withdraws into itself again, and begins its anti-democratic work."

"In fact it is not true, in any democracy, that all citizens participate in the formation of the law: that prerogative is reserved for the representatives."

"It is not true that they deliberate on all public affairs, domestic and foreign: this is the perquisite, not even of the representatives, but of the ministers. Citizens discuss affairs, ministers alone deliberate them."

"It is not true that citizens participate in the nomination of officials. It is power which names its subordinates, sometimes according to its own arbitrary will, sometimes according to certain conditions for appointment or promotion, the order and discipline of officials and centralization requiring that it be thus..."

"...According to democratic theory, the 'People' is incapable of governing itself: democracy, like monarchy, after having posed as its principle the sovereignty of the People, ends with a declaration of the incapacity of the People!"

"This is what is meant by the democrats, who once in the government, dream only of consolidating and strengthening the authority in their hands."³²

In the same year, 1848, Stephen Pearl Andrews published the first edition of his book, *The Science of Society*, which had become one of the mainstays of American anarchist literature. In it, he argued that:

"It is already the axiom of Democracy that that is the best government which governs least,—that, in other words, which leaves the largest domain to the Individual Sovereign. It may sound strange, and yet it is rigidly true, that nothing is more foreign to the essential nature of Democracy than the rule of majorities. Democracy asserts that all men are born free and equal—that is, that every individual is of right free from the governing control of every other and of all others. Democracy asserts, also, that this right is inalienable,—that it can neither be surrendered nor forfeited to another Individual, nor

to a majority of other individuals..."

"Genuine Democracy is identical with the no-government doctrine... The no-government men of our day... are, in fact, the genuine democrats."⁵³

In the 1852 edition of Lysander Spooner's *An Essay on the Trial by Jury*, Spooner argues for a concept of 'legitimate government':

"It is... a first principle, a very sine qua non of political freedom, that a man can be taxed only by his personal consent. And the establishment of this principle, with *trial by jury*, insures freedom... because: No man would pay his money unless he had first contracted for such a government as he was willing to support; and unless the government then kept itself within the terms of its contract, juries would not enforce the payment of the tax. Besides, the agreement to be taxed would probably be entered into but for a year at a time. If, in that year, the government proved itself either inefficient or tyrannical, to any serious degree, the contract would not be renewed. The dissatisfied parties, if sufficiently numerous for a new organization, would form themselves into a separate association for mutual protection. If not sufficiently numerous for that purpose, those who were conscientious would forego all governmental protection, rather than contribute to the support of a government which they deemed unjust."

"All legitimate government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties to it, for the protection of their rights against wrong-doers. In its voluntary character it is precisely similar to an association for mutual protection against fire or shipwreck. Before a man will join an association for these latter purposes, and pay the premium for being insured, he will, if he be a man of sense, look at the articles of the association; see what the company promises to do; what it is likely to do; and what are the rates of insurance. If he be satisfied on all these points, he will become a member, pay his premium for a year, and then hold the company to its contract. If the conduct of the company prove unsatisfactory, he will let his policy expire at the end of the year for which he has paid; will decline to pay any further premiums, and either seek insurance elsewhere, or take his own risk without any insurance. And as men act in the insurance of their ships and dwellings, they would act in the insurance of their properties, liberties and lives, in the political association, or government."

"The political insurance company, or government, have no more right, in nature or reason, to assume a man's consent to be protected by them, and to be taxed for that protection, when he has given no actual consent, than a fire or marine insurance company have to assume a man's consent to be protected by them, and to pay the premium, when his actual consent has never been given. To take a man's property without his consent is robbery; and to assume his consent, where no actual consent is given, makes the taking none the less robbery."⁵⁴

By the end of the nineteenth century, there had developed a great amount of literature on this subject in America and I do not have the space to completely detail the particulars of the literature.⁵⁵ I do want to note that these ideas are extensions of the ideas of republicanism and are within the republican tradition.⁵⁶ Many of these advocates never used the term, 'anarchist,' to describe themselves. This term became in relatively common usage only in the 1870's and 1880's, whereas prior to this time, it was used primarily as a term of opprobrium, much like the term, 'leveller,' two centuries before.

It is also important to note that, like the First Enlightenment, the ideas of the Second Enlightenment are a common tradition of both libertarians and socialists.

In 1848, Gustave de Molinari, Charles Dunoyer's principle disciple, said:

"Economist and socialist, we may be adversaries, but our ideal and purpose is one. We seek a society in which there will be no stint in the production of all that is needful, whether to support or to embellish human existence. We seek a society where the distribution of these products between their creators will accord with the dictates of pure justice... None among you will deny this truth, and, if we say that we seek by different paths, that is the sum of our difference."⁵⁷

That difference is the subject of the Third Enlightenment. This is where the wheat is separated from the chaff; the libertarians from the socialists.

THE THIRD ENLIGHTENMENT

The right of the labourer to the whole produce of his labour

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century there was only one social ideal which all radicals strove to establish and secure: a society of liberty and equality. There was no open conflict between libertarianism and socialism. Both were bent upon the realization of social equality; and if the libertarians proposed to bring it about by a wide distribution of national wealth, while the socialists preferred the general abolition of private property, the end was still the same and only the means different. The decision between individualism and collectivism was a matter of expediency rather than a question of principle.

Due to the development of the Industrial Revolution, the principles of liberty and economic equality became irreconcilable. Large-scale production proved its technical superiority. It became increasingly clear that full liberty would radically change the make-up of society while full economic equality would arrest all progress and ossify economic life. Thus, the radicals were faced with two theoretical alternatives: liberty without economic equality and economic equality without liberty.

The economists of the time were, in spite of themselves, forced to choose between economic liberty without social equality, and social equality without economic liberty. The old ideal, reconciling the two hostile principles on the basis of an equal distribution of wealth by giving each citizen enough productive property to gain his living independent of masters and men, had for the last and final time been stated by Jeremy Bentham.⁵⁸ His two major followers, Thomas Hodgskin and William Thompson, were the leaders of the two major schools of economic thought, libertarianism and socialism, respectively.⁵⁹

The very terms, socialism and individualism, originate in this period of time.

The word, 'socialist,' was used in print for the first time in the *Co-operative Magazine* of November, 1827,⁶⁰ and the term, 'individualism,' was invented at about the same time, coming into fairly common usage by the 1830's.

In order to understand the issues leading up to the division between libertarians and socialists in the nineteenth century, we have to go back to one of the points made earlier in this essay. This is the idea expressed by the Levellers as 'self-proprietty,' 'individuality,' and 'individual property by nature.' The classic description of natural property is given by John Locke in 1690, in his *Two Treatises of Government*:

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to...⁶¹

Labor, in the Lockean sense, means any act of appropriation of natural resources, ranging from bending over for the "Acorns (which) he pickt up under an Oak," to the launching of a complicated process of production which involves owning land.⁶²

Probably the best theoretical foundation for ownership and property rights in the eighteenth century was provided by William Wollaston in his *The Religion of Nature Delineated*, published initially in 1722.⁶³ He argues:

"Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them capable of distinct properties in things... That is, B and C exist so distinctly, that if there be any thing which B can call his, it will be for that reason not C's; and V.V. what is C's will for that reason not be B's."

"The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much his, as B is himself. It is impossible for C, or any other to see with the eyes of B; therefore they are eyes only to B; and when they cease to be his eyes, they cease to be eyes at all. He then has the sole property in them, it being impossible in nature, that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C."

"Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C; because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something; and therefore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made use of are his."

"The effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C; and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's. Because, what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces by his labor; or it is the product

of B by his labor; that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any property in that, which B only can truly call his, he would act contrary to truth."

"The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, for no other man can be the first possessor again. That, which no man has yet any title to, the finder may take without the violation of any truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's. Therefore to possess himself of it is not wrong. Since every man is obliged to consult his own interest and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth, not to act consonantly to this obligation is an omission that would be wrong. What he does therefore is right. And then if he does right in taking possession of it, he must from thence be the rightful possessor... There are many things which cannot be possessed without cultivation and the contrivance and labor of the first possessor. This has generally been the case of lands. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and sweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the intruder's pains and travel, is a most manifest violation of truth. It is asserting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his."

If B has the sole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the disposal of them besides B... For disposing of them is but using them as his. Therefore the act of B in exchanging them for something else, or bestowing them upon C, interferes not with truth; and so B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against truth, or that is wrong, in taking them; because he treats them as being what they are; as things, which come to him by the act of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of disposing of them. Thus C gets the title innocently."

"The first possessor has a right to defend his person, and such other things as can only be his, against the attempts of any aggressor; therefore if he cannot be forceably dispossessed without violence, no one has any right to dispossess him."⁶⁴

With Destutt de Tracy's *A Treatise on Political Economy* (translated with the aid of his American admirer, Thomas Jefferson) published in 1817, we see the theme of the relationship between personality and property becoming more clearly defined. As Destutt de Tracy stated:

"The idea of property is an effect of our willing faculty... It (is) certain that the idea of property can arise only in a being endowed with will. As soon as this individual knows accurately itself and its capacity to enjoy and to suffer, and to act necessarily, it sees clearly also that this self is the exclusive proprietor of the body which it animates, of the organs which it moves, of all their passions and their actions; for all this finishes and commences with this self is not moved but by its acts, and no other moral person can employ the same instruments nor be affected in the same manner... The idea of exclusive property arises then necessarily in a sensible being from this alone,

that it is susceptible of passion and action; and it rises in such a being because nature has endowed it with an inevitable and inalienable property, that of its individuality."

"The thine and the mine were never invented. They were acknowledged the day on which we could say thee and me; and the idea of me and thee, or rather of me and something other than me, has arisen, if not the very day on which a feeling being has experienced impressions, at least the one on which he has experienced the sentiment of willing, the possibility of acting. When afterwards among these resisting beings, consequently other than himself, the feeling and willing being has known that there were some feeling like himself, it has been forced to accord to them a personality other than his own...It (is) necessary first of all to recognize that there is a property anterior and superior to every institution, from which will always arise all the sentiments which are derived from all the others; for there is property, if not precisely everywhere that there is an individual sentiment, at least everywhere that there is an individual willing in consequence of his sentiment, and acting in consequence of his will."

"The thine and the mine are necessarily established amongst men; from this alone, that they are individuals feeling, willing, and acting distinctly the one from the other, that they have each one the inalienable, incommutable, and inevitable property, in their individuality and its faculties; and that consequently the idea of property is the necessary result, if not of the sole phenomenon of pure sensibility, at least of that of sensibility united to the will... We (have) the idea of personality, and that of property, that is to say the consciousness of our self, and that of the possession of its modifications. We recognize ourselves as possessors of our existence, and of its modes."⁶⁵

Thomas Hodgskin extends the idea further in his *The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted* published in 1832:

"Every man has a property in his own person; in fact, individuality—which is signified by the word *own*—cannot be disjoined from the person. Each individual learns his own shape and form, and even the existence of his limbs and body, from seeing and feeling them. These constitute his notion of *personal* identity, both for himself and others; and it is impossible to conceive—it is in fact a contradiction to say—that a man's limbs and body do not belong to himself: for the words him, self, and his body, signify the same material thing."

"As we learn the existence of our own bodies from seeing and feeling them, and as we see and feel the bodies of others, we have precisely similar grounds for believing in the individuality or identity of other persons, as for believing in our own identity. The ideas expressed by the words mine and thine, as applied to the produce of labour, are simply then an extended form of the ideas of personal

identity and individuality. We readily spread them from our hands and other limbs, to the things the hands seize, or fashion, or create, or the legs hunt down and overtake. Nor is this extension limited to material objects...these ideas are generally extended to the immaterial consequences of our actions."

"Thus, the natural idea of property is a mere extension of that of individuality; and it embraces all the mental as well as all the physical consequences of muscular exertion. As nature gives to labour whatever it produces—as we extend the idea of personal individuality to what is produced by every individual—not merely is a right of property established by nature, we see also that she takes means to make know the existence of that right. It is as impossible for men not to have a notion of a right of property, as it is for them to want the idea of personal identity. When either is totally absent, man is insane."⁶⁶

Published in 1855, Lysander Spooner's *Law of Intellectual Property* has a remarkably similar formulation:

"It is not our physical organs, but the mind, and only the mind, that takes cognizance even of material objects. We are in the habit of saying that the eyes sees any material object. But, in reality, it is only the mind that sees it...It uses the eye merely as an instrumentality for seeing it. An eye, without a mind, could see nothing. So also it is with the hand, as it is with the eye. We are in the habit of saying that the hand touches any material thing. But in reality, it is only the mind, that perceives the contact, or takes cognizance of the touch. The hand, without the mind, could feel nothing, and take cognizance of nothing, it should come in contact with. The mind simply uses the hand, as an instrument for touching; just as it uses the eye, as an instrument for seeing. It is, therefore, only the mind, that takes cognizance of any thing. And every thing, of which the mind does take cognizance, is equally wealth, whether it be material or immaterial; whether it be tangible or perceptible, through the instrumentality of our physical organs, or not."

"Property is simply wealth, that is possessed—that has an owner; in contradistinction to wealth, that has no owner, but lies exposed, unpossessed, and ready to be converted into property, by whomsoever chooses to make it his own."

"A man's body is his own. It is the property of his mind. (It is the mind that owns every thing that is property. Bodies own nothing; but are themselves subjects of property. Each body is the property of the mind that inhabits it.) And no man has the right..to take another man's body out of the control of his mind. In other words, no man can own another man's body."

"The natural wealth of the world belongs to those who first take possession of it. The right of property, in any article of wealth, is first acquired by simply taking possession of it."

"The wealth created by labor, is the rightful property of the creator, or producer. If the creator, or producer, of wealth, be not its

rightful proprietor, surely no one else can be; and such wealth must perish unused."

"The right of property has its foundation, first, in the natural right of each man to provide for his own subsistence; and, secondly, in his right to provide for his general happiness and well-being, in addition to a mere subsistence...The right to live, includes the right to accumulate the means of living; and the right to obtain happiness in general, includes the right to accumulate such commodities as minister to one's happiness. These rights, then, to live, and to obtain happiness, are the foundations of the right of property. Such being the case, it is evident that no other human right has a deeper foundation in the nature and necessities of man, than the right of property."⁶⁷

Finally, in the words of two French libertarians, Woloski and Levasseur, in 1884:

"If man acquires rights over things, it is because he is at once active, intelligent and free; by his activity he spreads over external nature; by his intelligence he governs it, and bends it to his use; by his liberty, he establishes between himself and it the relation of cause and effect and makes it his own."

"The producer has left a fragment of his own person in the thing which has thus become valuable, and may hence be regarded as a prolongation of the faculties of man acting upon external nature. As a free being he belongs to himself; now the cause, that is to say, the productive force, is himself; the effect, that is to say, the wealth produced, is still himself. Who shall dare contest his title of ownership so clearly marked by the seal of his personality? It is then, to the human being, the creator of all wealth, that we must come back...It is by labor that man impresses his personality on matter."

"Property, made manifest by labor, participates in the rights of the person whose emanation it is; like him, it is inviolable; like him, it is individual, because it has origin in the independence of the individual."⁶⁸

The aesthetic difference and the difference it makes

There is a fundamental idea, or theme, that can be traced through all of these writers; the Levellers in the 1640's, John Locke in 1690, William Wollaston in 1722, Destutt de Tracy in 1817, Thomas Hodgskin in 1832, Lysander Spooner in 1855, Woloski and Levasseur in 1884: Man is an *active* participant with the universe and society. It is a person's *mind* that acts, that creates. It is the *personality* which is the functional unit.

This is the fundamental difference between the libertarian and the socialist. For the socialist has a completely different mind-set, a completely different view of man. To a socialist, man is a fundamentally *passive* creature with regard to the universe and society. This is the aesthetic motive for thinking in terms of material laws of progress which the individual is inescapably drawn into,⁶⁹ and the motive for the stress on the *collective*, wherein the individual is submerged into the mass-man.

This is the reason why the radicals during the 1820's and 1830's divided into camps of individualists and socialists, when England was making the final leap into an industrial society. This was when the social question, "the right of the labourer to the whole produce of his labour," was the reigning issue of the day.⁷⁰

This idea, "the right of the labourer to the whole produce of his labour," is the key to understanding the differences between the two camps. With the libertarian, the locus of decision-making and productivity is with the individual. The proper due to the labourer is determined by the bargaining, 'the higgling,' between the labourer and the parties that he is purchasing and selling products to. The labourer is uniquely productive, and the rewards of his productivity are uniquely determined at each point of the interaction.

To the socialist, the decision-making powers and productivity resides with the collective, or 'society.' The productivity of the individual worker cannot be separated from the total collective. Thus, the reward to individual effort is disjoined from the individual effort. The question, what is "the whole produce of his labour," is answered by the collectivist thusly: "You are a single unit within the total, because you are *not* unique, and the rest of the units that comprise society are *not* uniquely productive, we, the collective (usually meaning the leaders in power), will pool all of your produce, your profits, and distribute them *evenly* between all of the units of society (minus, of course, the charges for handling and postage which will, of course, go to the leaders)."

This leads to attitudinal differences between libertarians and socialists (not to say cognitive dissonance!). The libertarian stresses the individual, and the socialist stresses the collective; and conversely, the libertarian almost always hates communism, and the socialist equates every evil that he can imagine with individualism—state capitalism, fascism, nazism, etc.⁷¹ This is also why the libertarian generally looks at history in terms of the individual and the socialist in terms of mass-movements. If a libertarian sees any iniquities, he (or she) seeks to correct the problem on an individual or voluntary basis. When the socialist sees the same iniquities, the solution is sought through collective means, generally through the Mad Moloch of mass-man, the State. A socialist "would conclude that we need a world government to deal with the problem of going to the bathroom when our body tells us it's time to do so."⁷²

Class theory

Many of the ideas debated in the Third Enlightenment came from the figures associated with the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century: George Buchanan, Dugald Stewart, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith (certainly the best known), Adam Ferguson. Their focus was on the relationship between economics and politics. "Their chief contribution to the thought of the period lies in their realization of the injustices of a world where the labourer's toil was poorly rewarded and his stake in the share of land and wealth less than his activities and rights deserved. They studied the wealth of nations and the laws of political economy"⁷³ in order to correct these iniquities.

The libertarian economists of the time "stressed the *creation* of wealth, rather than its transfer (or distribution). International trade was seen as a source of mutual benefits, rather than of differential gain, since it led to a larger and cheaper (total) output. Both imperialism and slavery were regarded...as loosing ventures, for they inhibited the creation of wealth while concentrating on its appropriation. (They) saw the gains from imperialism going to a small class of

wealthy businessmen and colonial officials...greatly outweighed by the cost paid by the taxpayers to maintain the empire."⁷⁴ They attacked the role played by the dominant social classes within the government, the landed aristocracy, the rising class of capitalists, and the political powers that be.⁷⁵ They opposed the contemporary wars in which their countries were engaged or were being urged to engage.⁷⁶

In Marxist literature, the bourgeoisie is the primary exploiting and parasitic class in modern society. However, the 'bourgeoisie' was viewed in two different ways. In the U.S. and England, it tended to mean the class of entrepreneurs and capitalists who make their living by buying and selling on the free market. The exploitation involved the classical Marxist conceptual apparatus of the labor theory of value, the appropriation of surplus value by the employer, etc., etc. On the European continent the term 'bourgeoisie' was not necessarily connected with market relations. It also meant the class of civil servants and rentiers off the public debt, rather than a class of businessmen. That the former classes and their allies were directly involved in systematic exploitation was generally recognized by the libertarians of the nineteenth century. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his *Recollections*, states that "the middle class," which came to power in 1830 under the "bourgeois monarchy" of Louis Philippe "entrenched itself in every vacant place, prodigiously augmented the number of places and accustomed itself to live almost as much upon the treasury as upon its own industry."⁷⁷

Similarly, as Marx argued in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in 1852:

"This executive power, with its enormous bureaucracy and military organization, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half-million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy. The Legitimist Monarchy and the July Monarchy added nothing but a greater division of labor, growing in the same measure as the division of labor within bourgeois society created new groups of interests, and therefore new material for state administration. Every common interest was straightway severed from society, counterposed to it as a higher general interest, snatched from the activity of society's members themselves and made an object of government activity, from a bridge, a schoolhouse and the communal property of a village community to the railways, the national wealth and the national university of France...All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor...under the second Bonaparte (Napoleon III)...the state (seems) to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position thoroughly."⁷⁸

In Marx's *The Civil War in France*, published in 1871, he speaks of the Paris Commune's aim to restore "to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of society...The

commune made that catchword of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality, by destroying the two greatest sources of expenditure—the standing army and State functionaries."⁷⁹

In Engels' preface to the 1891 edition of Marx's *The Civil War in France*, Engels says that:

"Society had created its own organs to look after its common interests...But these organs, at whose head was the state power, had in the course of time, in pursuance of their own interests, transformed themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society...Nowhere do 'politicians' form a more separate and powerful section of the nation than precisely in North America (the U.S.). There, each of the two major parties which alternately succeed each other in power is itself in turn controlled by people who make a business of politics...It is in America that we see best how there takes place this process of the state power making itself independent in relation to society...We find two great gangs of political speculators, who alternately take possession of the state power and exploit it by the most corrupt means and for the most corrupt ends—the nation is powerless against these two great cartels of politicians who are ostensibly its servants, but in reality dominate and plunder it."⁸⁰

Much of this is consistent with the libertarian approach to class analysis. Lysander Spooner, one of the greatest libertarians that North America has produced, best explained the American situation:

"In this country, there is no visible, permanent head, or chief, of these robbers and murderers, who call themselves 'the government.' That is to say, there is no one man who calls himself the state, or even emperor, king or sovereign...There are only certain men, who call themselves presidents, senators and representatives, and claim to be the authorized agents, for the time being, or for certain short periods, of all 'the people of the United States;' but who can show no credentials, or powers of attorney, or any other open, authentic evidence that they are so; and who notoriously are not so; but are really only the agents of a secret band of robbers and murderers...who, they trust, will openly or secretly, when the crisis comes, sustain them in all their usurpations and crimes."

"What is important to be noticed is, that these so-called agents of all 'the people of the United States,' the moment their exactions meet with any formidable resistance from any portion of 'the people' themselves, are obliged, like their co-robbers and murderers in Europe, to fly at once to the lenders of blood money, for the means to sustain their power. And the borrow their money on the same principle, and for the same purpose, viz., to be expended in shooting down all those 'people of the United States'—their own constituents and principals, as they profess to call them—who resist the robberies and enslavement which these borrowers of the money are practising upon them. And they expect to repay the loans, if at all, only from the proceeds of the future robberies, which they anticipate it will be

easy for them and their successors to perpetrate through a long series of years, upon their pretended principals, if they can but shoot down now some...of them, and thus strike terror into the rest."

"Perhaps the facts were never made more evident, in any country on the globe, than in our own, that these soulless blood-money loan-mongers are the real rulers; that they rule from the most sordid and mercenary motives; that the ostensible government, the presidents, senators, and representatives, so-called, are merely their tools' and that no ideas of, or regard for, justice or liberty had anything to do in inducing them to lend their money."

"And why are these men so ready to lend money? Solely for this reason, viz., that such loans are considered better investments than loans for purposes of honest industry. They pay higher rates of interest; and it is less trouble to look after them. This is the whole matter."⁸¹

There are two theories of the state and exploitation within Marxist thought. There is the customarily discussed and very familiar one of the state as the instrument of the ruling class which locates exploitation within the ruling class, and there is the theory of the state which pits itself against 'society' and 'nation.'⁸² Ultimately, the problem is that there are two mutually exclusive definitions of capitalism found in Marxist literature. The term is used to denote production according to the dictates of the market, or in Marxist terminology, 'commodity production';⁸³ and also in terms of class relations, that is, ownership of the means of production by the ruling class or 'bourgeoisie.' The first is the economic definition and the second is the sociological definition. Marx seems to have thought that the two were compatible and slides back and forth between the two without warning.

However, if one uses the economic definition, it follows that the less government control and manipulation of the market, the more capitalistic the society. It follows from this that price controls, subsidies, licensing regulations, etc., must be classified as anti-capitalistic since they are modifications or restrictions of the market. Since the State does not sell its services on the market, it is incompatible with the economic definition of capitalism. Not only is 'state capitalism' a contradiction in terms, but it follows that capitalism taken to its logical extreme, leads inexorably to anarchism.

If the sociological definition is used, the state becomes perfectly compatible with capitalism. Whatever serves to entrench the bourgeois class, the owners of the means of production, in power is, therefore, 'capitalistic.' Marx argued that market competition would force the 'rate of profit' to fall and ultimately to disappear, which means that the two definitions lead to mutually exclusive definitions. Since the economic definition entails pure laissez-faire, and government intervention to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie is anathema. Yet this is precisely the essential element when the sociological definition is utilized.

Marx saw that for the dominant economic class to entrench itself in power it must first be able to institutionalize its position, and this it can do only by obtaining control of the state. With the state backing them, the bourgeoisie are then able to protect their positions from the threat of competition by establishing tariff restrictions, subsidies, licensing regulations, etc., etc. For Marx, the state is

the principal instrument by which the dominant economic class is able to exploit the rest of society. Thus, he writes that 'the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.' Political power is defined as "the organized power of one class for oppressing another." And even more clearly: "Every class struggle is a political struggle."⁸⁴ Therefore, while the state is incompatible with the economic definition, it is absolutely essential for the sociological one.⁸⁵

With libertarian class theory, there is no confusion between varying definitions of capitalism and exploitation. Political intervention in the market process constitutes the ultimate source of both stratified class relationships and the consequent economic exploitation of one class by another. This was elucidated in the debates over Say's Law of Markets in the early nineteenth century. J.-B. Say stated that in a free market there are unlimited investment opportunities and the overaccumulation of capital occurs at the behest of special interests.⁸⁶ Say's principal followers, Charles Dunoyer and Charles Comte, were the major exponents of libertarian class analysis on the European continent.⁸⁷

Political intervention inevitably transforms the market system from a matrix of purely 'economic means' for the acquisition and preservation of wealth to a system infused with the principles and institutions of the 'political means.' The 'economic means' involves the acquisition of wealth through one's own labor and subsequent voluntary exchange relationships while the 'political means' covers all other means of acquiring wealth. The latter therefore encompasses the direct or indirect expropriation of previously produced wealth either through direct coercion or through the threat of coercion.⁸⁸ The prevalent means of expropriation (and hence exploitation) is taxation. Taxation is also the source of indirect forms of intervention which, in turn, leads to even greater exploitation. This harks back to the terminology of the Paineite radicals in England: 'taxpayers' and 'taxeaters.'

While a free market society represents the institutionalization of the economic means, the state is the organization of the political means. The introduction of the political means into a market system creates a system of state capitalism, i.e., a market-oriented system with increasing elements of monopoly and class privilege incorporated within it. The state is antithetical to the free market and statist intervention produces a hampered market system: a system of monopoly privilege and the systematization of exploitation, class antagonisms and socio-economic disharmony of interests.

As long as the use of the political means continues, social evolution will be shaped by a process of class conflict. The state, as the institutionalization of the political means, necessarily generates a process of continuing class conflict since the political means, by its very nature, creates a series of negative sum relationships—that is, one individual or group gains only at the expense of another. This is in comparison to the economic means characteristic of market systems where all exchanges lead to increases of utility for all participants entering into them, otherwise the exchanges would never have been consummated in the first place. Antagonistic interests, therefore, emerge from the application of the political means between those who gain from the use of the political means and those whose wealth is expropriated.

The beneficiaries of the political means in a market-oriented economy are dependent on the existence of the economic means of order to survive and prosper. The political means presupposes the economic means since the political

means alone is unproductive and parasitic, whereas the economic means can exist and, in fact, thrives best in the absence of the political means.

This parasitic relationship cannot persist indefinitely, for the political means inevitably distorts the price mechanism necessary for the successful operation of the economic means in an advanced market economy. Distortion of the price mechanism produces market dislocations which necessitate one of two actions: either the initial intervention through the political means must be eliminated or additional intervention will be introduced in an effort to remove the existing dislocation. Rather than attempting to remove the original causes of these distortions, the response of the state policy makers has generally been to expand state intervention in the market system, thereby aggravating the original distortions even further. This suggests that the initial intervention sets in motion a process of retrogression from a relatively free market to a system characterized by an increasingly fascistic set of economic relationships.⁸⁹

As Albert Jay Nock said in *Our Enemy, the State*:

“Every intervention by the State enables another, and this in turn another, and so on indefinitely; and the State stands ever ready and eager to make them, often on its own motion, often again wangling plausibility for them through the specious suggestion of interested persons. Sometimes the matter at issue is in its nature simple, socially necessary, and devoid of any character that would bring it into the purview of politics. For convenience, however, complications are erected on it; then presently someone sees that these complications are exploitable, and proceeds to exploit them; then another, and another, until the rivalries and collisions of interest thus generated issue in a more or less general disorder. When this takes place, the logical thing, obviously, is to recede, and let the disorder be settled in the slower and more troublesome way, but the only effective way, through the operation of natural laws. But in such circumstances recession is never for a moment thought of; the suggestion would be put down as sheer lunacy...The State...intervenes by imposing another set of complications upon the first; these in turn are found exploitable, another demand arises, another set of complications, still more intricate, is erected upon the first two; and the same sequence is gone through again and again...”⁹⁰

Conclusion

“Let us suppose that an ichthyologist is exploring the life of the ocean. He casts a net into the waer and brings up a fishy assortment. Surveying his catch, he arrives at two generalizations:

- (1) No sea-creature is less than two inches long.
- (2) All sea-creatures have gills.”

“An onlooker may object: ‘There are plenty of sea-creatures under two inches long, only your net is not adapted to catch them.’”

“The ichthyologist dismisses this objection contemptuously: ‘Anything uncatchable by my net is *ipso facto* outside the scope of ichthyological knowledge. In short, what my net can’t catch isn’t fish.’”

“A more tactful onlooker makes a rather different suggestion: ‘May I point out that you could have arrived more easily at the same generalization by examining the net and the method of using it? The net can never bring anything that it is not adapted to catch.’”⁹¹

There are many *ichthyologists* of libertarianism who claim that libertarianism is tied to: individualism, Austrian or Chicagoan economics, egoism, utopianism, nihilism, anarchism, a night-watchman state,...the list is innumerable. For libertarians expound a wide range of philosophies in many different areas: metaphysics, ethics, economics. There are Aristotelians, Kantians, existentialists, Christians, deists, free-thinkers who would agree on little else except restricting the sphere of government activity.

While I have given you a somewhat panoramic view of the libertarian *tradition*, beginning with the traditions of Enlightenment I within libertarian thought, following that up with a discussion of the traditions of the Republican Revolution and the gradual progression of the ideas from radical republicanism to the evolution of what is now frequently called anarchism, and, finally, to the Third Enlightenment, it should always be remembered that libertarians adhere to a wide diversity of positions.

Libertarianism is a direction, a movement toward freedom and away from statism. Those who uphold libertarianism uphold a free society as a guiding light, a standard for action. Libertarianism is not a single, unified philosophy. Rather, libertarianism is an umbrella concept under whose cover many approaches and schools of thought blossom forth. Libertarianism embraces all of the philosophies that seek to restrict the sphere of state action and release the free modes of social action.

FOOTNOTES

¹*The Three Enlightenments* is based on a lecture given at Cypress College on Feb. 23, 1979 for the Society for Libertarian Life: *19th Century Libertarians and their Plagiarist—Karl Marx*.

²Richard Overton, “The Baiting of the Great Bull of Bashan,” A. L. Morton, editor, *Freedom in Arms: A Selection of Leveller Writings* (New York; International Library, 1975), p. 287.

³*Aspects of American Liberty* (Philadelphia; American Philosophical Society, 1977), edited by George W. Corner, pp. 47-55. Prof. Palmer extends the idea only to Enlightenments I and II.

⁴*ibid.*, pp. 49-49. See also *Freethought in the United States* (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1978) by Marshall G. Brown and Gordon Stein, p. 17.

⁵See *Religion of the American Enlightenment* (New York; Crowell, 1968) by G. Adolph Koch, pp. 3-73; *The Enlightenment in America* (New York; Oxford U. Press, 1978) by Henry F. May, pp. 105-277; *The American Enlightenment* (New York; Braziller, 1965) by Adrienne Koch, pp. 19-48; and *Freethought...*, Brown and Stein, pp. 16-23.

⁶For a discussion of this subject, see the introduction to William O. Reichert's *Partisans of Freedom* (Bowling Green, Ohio; Bowling Green U. Popular Press, 1976) pp. 1-33.

⁷For the most authoritative works on free-thought, one need not look further than the following books by John Mackinnon Robertson: *A History of Freethought: Ancient and Modern* (London; Watts & Co., 1936. 2 vols., 1031 pp.), *A History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century* (London; Watts & Co., 1929. 635 pp.), and *A Short History of Freethought* (New York; Russell & Russell, 1957. 447 pp.).

⁸*Deism: An Anthology* (Princeton; Van Nostrand, 1968) edited by Peter Gay, p. 30.

⁹George H. Smith, "The Literature of Freethought," *Libertarian Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1977, p. 12.

¹⁰*Deism...*, Gay, p. 141.

¹¹*A Short History...*, Robertson, p. 386.

¹²*ibid.*, p. 350.

¹³"The Literature of Freethought," Smith, p. 15.

¹⁴*A Plea for Atheism* (London; Besant & Bradlaugh, 1864) by Charles Bradlaugh, p. 4

¹⁵*Atheism: the Case Against God* (Los Angeles; Nash Publishing, 1974) by George H. Smith, pp. 7, 16. For the atheist, there are three insuperable barriers to cross to Christianity; (1) the establishment of a rigorous, non-contradictory definition of a God, (2) the formulation of a proof that such a God exists and (3) some meaningful relationship between such a God and Christianity.

¹⁶*Aquinas* (Baltimore; Penguin, 1963) by F. C. Copleston, p. 214.

¹⁷*Principles of Ethics* (Indianapolis; Liberty Press, 1979) by Herbert Spencer, Vol. I, p. 91.

¹⁸*ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 90.

¹⁹*ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 121.

²⁰There are two recent editions of Etienne de la Boetie's work: *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude* (New York; Free Life Editions, 1975) and *The Will to Bondage* (Colorado Springs, Colorado; Ralph Myles, 1974). I am, of course, making a distinction between libertarian sentiments and libertarian theory.

²¹The works by the French Huegenots, Hotman, Beza and Mornay are included

in *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century* (New York; Western Publishers, 1969) edited by Julian H. Franklin.

²²See, for example, F. A. Hayek's essay, "Liberalism," in his *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 124, and Lord Acton's *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Glencoe; Free Press, 1949), p. 149. The Levellers were the first to integrate the concept of absolute property ownership (with an emphasis on self-ownership, 'self-proprietorship') into natural rights theory. For the statist use of natural rights doctrines before this period, see *Natural Rights Theories* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979). For the development of property theory in seventeenth century England, see the highly significant paper by G. E. Aylmer, "The Meaning and Definition of 'Property' in Seventeenth-Century England," *Past and Present*, No. 86 (Feb. 1980). There are strong indications that the Levellers were at the cutting edge of this development.

²³*Freedom in Arms...*, Morton, p. 252.

²⁴*ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁵*Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1934) edited by William Haller, p. 105.

²⁶*ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁷*English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century* (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1959) by G. P. Gooch, p. 128.

²⁸*Tracts...*, Haller, p. 113 and *The Levellers and the English Revolution* (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1961) by H. N. Brailsford, p. 140.

²⁹*The Levellers...*, Brailsford, p. 119.

³⁰*ibid.*, p. 121.

³¹*ibid.*, p. 317. See also "The Reactions of Women" in *Politics, Religion and the English Civil War* (London; Edward Arnold, 1973) edited by Brian Manning, pp. 178-222.

³²*The Levellers...*, Brailsford, pp. 618-9.

³³*Freedom in Arms...*, Morton, p. 65. For a more complete discussion of the Leveller concern over conquest, see "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," *Historical Journal*, VIII, No. 2 (1965) by Quentin Skinner, pp. 151-78.

³⁴Robert L'Estrange, "The Observator," I, No. 445 (Nov. 28, 1683) quoted in *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959) by Caroline Robbins, p. 8. See also *Milton in the Puritan Revolution* (New York; Humanities Press, 1963) by Don M. Wolfe and *That Grand Whig, Milton* (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1952) by George F. Sensabaugh for

the late 17th century and *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1973) by Bernard Bailyn and *The English Libertarian Heritage* (Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) edited by David L. Jacobson for the 18th century.

³⁵*Thomas Paine's Common Sense: The Call to Independence* (Woodbury; Barron's, 1975) edited by Thomas Wendel, p. 20. See also *Conceived in Liberty* (New Rochelle, New York; Arlington House, 1969) by Murray N. Rothbard, Vol. IV, pp. 135-40.

³⁶*Thomas Paine's...*, Wendel, p. 25.

³⁷*Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1976) by Eric Foner, p. 79.

³⁸*The Life and Major Writings of Thomas Paine* (Secaucus, New Jersey; Citadel Press, 1974) edited by Philip S. Foner, p. xiv.

³⁹*Tom Paine: America's Godfather* (New York; E. P. Dutton, 1945) by W. E. Woodward, p. 80.

⁴⁰See the introduction by Peter Campbell in *What is the Third Estate?* London; Pall Mall Press, 1963) by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, edited by S. E. Finer, pp. 1-31. On Sieyes, see *Two Rebel-Priests of the French Revolution* (San Francisco; R and E Research Associates, 1975) by Raymond L. Carol, pp. 1-17. For the importance of deism in the French Revolution, see *A Short History...*, Robertson, pp. 351-5.

⁴¹*Rights of Man* (Baltimore; Penguin Books, 1971) by Thomas Paine, edited by Henry Collins.

⁴²*The English Jacobins* (New York; Scribner's, 1968) by Carl B. Cone, *The Friends of Liberty* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1979) by Albert Goodwin and *Threats of Revolution in Britain: 1789-1848* (Hamden; Archon Books, 1977) by Malcolm I. Thomis and Peter Holt.

⁴³*Rights of Man*, Paine, p. 36.

⁴⁴*The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (New York; New American Library, 1962) by E. J. Hobsbawm, p. 104.

⁴⁵"The Contribution of the Intelligentsia towards the Greek Independence Movement, 1798-1821," by Catherine Koumariou in *The Struggle for Greek Independence* (Hamden, Connecticut; Archon Books, 1973) edited by Richard Clogg, pp. 72, 75.

⁴⁶*The German Idea of Freedom* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1972) by Leonard Krieger, p. 139.

⁴⁷*The First Russian Radical* (London; Allen & Unwin, 1959) by David Marshall

Long, p. 115.

⁴⁸*The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1958) by Richard Herr, pp. 438-442.

⁴⁹*ibid.*, p. 442, and *Santiago F. Puglia, An Early Philadelphia Propagandist for Spanish American Independence* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina; University of North Carolina Press, 1977) by Merle E. Simmons, pp. 41-73.

⁵⁰*The Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913* (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1976) by James D. Cockcroft, p. 71, and *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora: 1821-1853* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1968) by Charles A. Hale, pp. 188-214.

⁵¹*The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York; Norton, 1973) by John Lynch, pp. 27-29.

⁵²From *Anarchism* (New York; Atherton Press, 1970) edited by Robert Hoffman, pp. 40-69. For more on this important period, see *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1960) by Priscilla Robertson.

⁵³*The Science of Society* (Bombay; Libertarian Socialist Institute, 1948) by Stephen Pearl Andrews, pp. 22-3.

⁵⁴*An Essay on the Trial by Jury* (Boston; Jewett & Co., 1852) by Lysander Spooner, pp. 222-3.

⁵⁵See *Men Against the State* (Colorado Springs; Ralph Myles, 1970) by James J. Martin and *Pioneers of American Freedom* (Los Angeles; Rocker Publications Committee, 1949) by Rudolf Rocker.

⁵⁶*Pioneers...*, Rocker, pp. 145-81. It is interesting to note that the Levellers were also attacked as 'anarchists.'

⁵⁷"'Utopie de la Liberte'"—A Letter to Socialists, Gustave de Molinari, *Journal des Economistes*, June 15, 1848, quoted in his *The Society of Tomorrow* (New York; Putnam's, 1904), pp. 206-7.

⁵⁸*Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1944) by Werner Stark, pp. 51-2. See also my *Thomas Hodgskin, Forgotten Libertarian* (Los Angeles; Los Angeles Libertarian Seminars, 1978).

⁵⁹"Thomas Hodgskin and the Individualists" by C. H. Driver in *Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Age of Reaction & Reconstruction: 1815-65* (London; Harrap, 1932) edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 191-220.

⁶⁰*A Survey of Socialism* (London; Macmillan, 1928) by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, p. 22. I am using the term 'socialist,' in the modern sense in this discussion. For an alternate view on 'socialist,' see *Instead of a Book* (New York; Haskell House,

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⁶¹*Two Treatises of Government* (New York; New American Library, 1963) by John Locke, edited by Peter Laslett, pp. 328-9. This contains the important introduction and notes by Laslett.

⁶²"John Locke and the labor theory of value," Karen I. Vaughn, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Winter 1978, p. 313.

⁶³See the paper by George H. Smith, "William Wollaston on Property Rights," (ms.; Los Angeles Libertarian Seminars, 1977), reprinted in *The Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Fall 1978, pp. 217-24.

⁶⁴*The Religion of Nature Delineated* (Delmar, New York; Scholar's Facsimiles & Reprints, 1974) by William Wollaston, pp. 127-135.

⁶⁵*A Treatise on Political Economy* (Georgetown, D. C.; Milligan, 1817) by Destutt de Tracy, pp. 47-53.

⁶⁶*The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted* (London; B. Steil, 1832) by Thomas Hodgskin, pp. 28-30.

⁶⁷*The Law of Intellectual Property* (Boston; Bela Marsh, 1855) by Lysander Spooner, pp. 11-28. The first sections of *The Law...* contain the finest libertarian statements on ownership produced in the 19th century.

⁶⁸"Property," by Leon Woloski and Emile Levasseur in *Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science* (Chicago; M. B. Cary & Co., 1884), III, pp. 392-3, quoted in *For a New Liberty* (New York; Macmillan, 1978) by Murray N. Rothbard, pp. 36-7.

⁶⁹*The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science* (Kansas City; Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, 1978) by Ludwig von Mises, pp. 28-32; and *Classical Economics Reconsidered* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1974) by Thomas Sowell, pp. 128-35.

⁷⁰See Anton Menger's *The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour* (London; Macmillan, 1899) and the introduction by H. S. Foxwell for a good discussion of this issue; and also Israel Kirzner's "Producer, Entrepreneur and the Right to Property," in *Property in a Humane Economy* (LaSalle; Open Court, 1974) edited by Samuel Blumenfeld, pp. 245-62. This book is a good introduction to the subject of ownership.

⁷¹I have seen many writings with libertarian sentiments, including quotes from such moral monsters as Benito Mussolini and Adolph Hitler. However, libertarian sentiments do not a libertarian theory make, to paraphrase an old saying.

⁷²"Why make it worse?" by Alan Bock, in *Cleaning House* (Los Angeles; Aware, 1970) edited by Steve Goldstein, p. 1.

⁷³*Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen*, Robbins, p. 220.

⁷⁴*Classical...*, Sowell, p. 11.

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⁷⁷*Recollections* (New York; Meridian, 1959) by Alexis de Tocqueville, pp. 2-3; quoted in "Classical liberal exploitation theory; a comment on Prof. Liggio's paper," by Ralph Raico, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Summer 1977, p. 179.

⁷⁸*Selected Works* (Moscow; Progress, 1968) by Marx and Engels, pp. 170-1, quoted in "Classical..." Raico, pp. 179-80.

⁷⁹*ibid.*, p. 293, quoted in "Classical..." Raico, pp. 180, 183.

⁸⁰*ibid.* p. 261, quoted in "Classical..." Raico, pp. 180.

⁸¹*No Treason; A Constitution of No Authority* (Larkspur, Colorado; Pine Tree Press, 1966) by Lysander Spooner, pp. 49-50, 46.

⁸²"Classical..." Raico, p. 180.

⁸³See *Marx's Theory of Exchange, Alienation and Crisis* (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1973) by P. C. Roberts and M. Stephenson.

⁸⁴*The Communist Manifesto* (New York; Washington Square Press, 1970) by Marx and Engels, pp. 61, 73, 95.

⁸⁵"Class Analysis and Economic Systems," by David Osterfield, *Libertarian Forum*, Oct. 1975, p. 5.

⁸⁶"The Transportation of Criminals: A Brief Political-economic History," by Leonard Liggio, in *Assessing the Criminal* (Cambridge; Ballinger, 1977) edited by Randy E. Barnett and John Hagel III, pp. 284-94; "Charles Dunoyer and French classical liberalism," by Leonard P. Liggio in *The Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Summer 1977, pp. 153-78; and *Say's Law* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1972) by Thomas Sowell, pp. 168-90. Liggio's "Transportation..." contains a good discussion of the relationship between the Ricardian socialist, Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Karl Marx.

⁸⁷"Charles Dunoyer..." Liggio, pp. 154-73.

⁸⁸*The State* (New York; Huebsh, 1922) by Franz Oppenheimer, pp. 24-7.

⁸⁹"Toward a Theory of State Capitalism: Ultimate Decision-making and Class Structure," Walter Grinder and John Hagel III, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Winter 1977, pp. 68, 69, 66-7.

⁹⁰*Our Enemy, the State* (Caldwell, Idaho; Caxton Printers, 1959) by Albert Jay Nock, pp. 189-91.

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This paper is dedicated to Baldy (RIP), Spencer and Leonard, the Peaceful Revolutionists—KRGJR.

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